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Here I respond to Dr. Lawrence Welch's critique' of my essay on
immediate material cooperation and its application to a particular case of
direct sterilization which appeared in this journal. I focus on four topics: the
quality of his representation of my views, the concept of immediate material
cooperation, the application of that concept, and the notion of division

I. The Quality of His Representation of My Views
In beginning, I acknowledge that the quality of representation is central
to any debate. I appreciate the care with which WeIch read and presented
my essays. Above all, I appreciate the time he spent on the case that I used
which concerns the only Catholic health care facility, in an American city of
about 100,000 people, which will lose its remarkable obstetrics staff who are
observant of the Ethical and Religious Directives (ERD), if the facility does
not cede to their one demand that contradicts the ERD: namely in the few
cases where a woman has a cesarian delivery and requests a subsequent tubal
ligation, the staff would honor that request for what they claim are a variety
of compelling medical and ethical reasons. A further condition of the case is
that the facility could not replace this staff; on the contrary, the staff is
capable of establishing its own services elsewhere. 3 This case could then be
a rare instance of immediate material cooperation, if the bishop and the CEO
were to judge prudentially that the loss of these services would compromise
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the facility's mission.
Nonetheless, there are a few points that he implicitly or explicitly
attributes to me that need, however, to be corrected. Let me note them.
Welch makes much of the fact that I wrote "duress appears repeatedly" in
both the 1975 Responsum from the Congregation for the Doctrine of the
Faith (CDF) on sterilizations in Catholic Hospitals and the USCC-NCCB
commentary on it. He correctly points out that the word doesn't appear in
the former. 4 However, it is implicitly in the former, as it is explicitly in the
latter. It must be: if there is no duress, there can be no legitimate material
cooperation. Absent duress, cooperation is formal. My ascribing duress to
the Responsum was simply to acknowledge that the Responsum foresaw the
possibility of legitimate cooperation regarding sterilization (something which
he acknowledges) and I added that the possibility could only be due to
duress. I cannot imagine the Responsum making sense without the notion of
duress.
Later Welch ascribes to me a presupposition that is unfounded, that is,
by extension I claim that the Responsum mentioned duress in connection
with immediate material cooperation, that the Responsum "teach(es) even
implicitly that duress somehow turns implicit formal cooperation into a
permissible form of immediate material cooperation," and that the
Responsum refers "even implicitly to immediate material cooperation under
duress in the case of direct sterilization."s I never made any of those claims.
I claimed simply that the Responsum aU-ows for material cooperation in
sterilization. But I never suggested that the Responsum makes the type of
technical distinctions thatWelch seems to think I did.

II. The Concept of Immediate Material Cooperation
How do I ground the concept immediate material cooperation? Years
ago, I wrote the first of several articles on material cooperation. In doing
research on it, I found that under extreme circumstances, manualists
recognized a difference between implicit formal cooperation and immediate
material cooperation. Like myself, they did not believe that the former
"turned" into the latter, though Welch rhetorically admonishes me for doing
just that. Rather, they recognized that an immediate involvement with the
object of an intrinsically wrong action might not necessarily be implicit
formal cooperation. That is, if a person were compelled into the immediate
involvement, then the cooperation was not necessarily formal. I originally
found these cases in Merkelbach and Noldin,6 and later in sixteenth century
7
case handbooks, like the one by Dr. William Allen and Robert Persons.
None of these casuists ever made a general explanation of this distinction,
nor did they systematize their thoughts, but they did recognize that on rare
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occasions we should not call someone's immediate material cooperation
implicit formal cooperation.
I take exception then to Welch ' s rhetorical comment about duress
"turn(ing) implicit formal cooperation into a permissible form of immediate
material cooperation ." Generally speaking, immediate material cooperation
would be implicit formal , why else would there be immediate involvement?
But in some rare instances, from those concerning matters of justice to the
exchange of marital dues, casuists and manualists saw that immediate
material cooperation was not considered implicit formal. Thus, it is not, as
Welch suggests, an abuse of casuistry: we are not looking for excuses to do
what we want to do nor are we trying to "tum" sinful cooperation into
permitted cooperation. Rather for centuries moralists have occasionally
asked, whether, when there is something we definitively oppose because it is
counter to church teaching, must Church members always refrain from
cooperating in that activity even when their failure to do so would mean the
demise of their life, facility, or department? Here, I hasten to add that we
would never ask the question about an activity that destroyed human life;
both the ERD and Evangelium vitae have rightly pointed out that such
activity could never be a matter of legitimate cooperation.
Regardless of Welch ' s charges, I have never found nor claimed that
magisterial documents address the distinction between immediate material
and implicit formal.
(Welch even suggests that I say that the NCCB
commentary does.8 ) Rather I found it, as most moralists find traditional
insights, in the writings of "approved theologians" in the casuist and
manualist traditions. That location is where, normally, we find complicated
methodological principles.
Moreover, I think that critical reflection helps us to recognize that these
theologians were right. Logically speaking, we could imagine as others in
previous times have, that immediate material cooperation could be
distinguishable under extreme duress from formal cooperation . The insight
enjoys both internal and external certitude.
Regarding the former, the
claims are evidently cogent; regarding the latter, the claims have been
supported by significant voices both historically and contemporaneously.
Furthermore, the distinction is being well appropriated by a variety of
other significant voices. Here I think of three relevant developments. First,
the distinction appears in the ERD appendix. The appendix was developed
by a committee (the Committee on Doctrine) of bishops and archbishops
who were trained in moral theology and recognized the credibility of the
distinction . Second, before the bishops voted on the ERD, that committee
submitted the directives and the appendix to the CDF. After the CDF's
approval, the committee presented it to their brother bishops who in turn
consulted their advisors in moral theology. After months of consideration,
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the chainnan of the bishops' committee presented the entire document to the
NCCB for a vote and the chainnan specifically addressed the distinction in
his presentation of the ERD before the full assembly of bishops. After broad
consultation, then, with both CDF and the NCCB, the bishops voted
unanimously for the document. Third, on later occasions, I have been told
by bishops from other countries, that no less than Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger
has told other national conferences of bishops that the NCCB' s ERD are
worthy of imitation.
I cannot imagine the cardinal making these
recommendations without implicitly, at least, acknowledging the legitimacy
of the distinction.
Thus, regarding the distinction itself, I would be surprised were CDF
or any official organ of the church to deny the moral intelligibility of the
distinction. Likewise, I could not imagine that they would deny its
traditional roots. I could imagine, however, that the CDF might want to
insist on the rare application of the distinction. I have insisted on this point
repeatedly. In fact, in the case that I presented, I explained that a bishop
might (note: not should!) consider the case as indicative of the rare, but
legitimate a type of immediate cooperation. I concluded that it was a case
that would eventually belong to prudential judgment of those directly
responsible. Thus I oppose any broad use of the distinction . Why? Because
I do not believe there are many instances of extreme duress.
Moreover, I add that while some health care facilities have
attempted immediate material cooperation on sufficiently coercive grounds,
others have not. That is, the latter could have avoided any immediate
involvement in the action and still remained open to perform their mission.
Thus, I do not deny that some facilities have illicitly used the distinction and
those contracts will be recognized as illicit, not because they were instances
of immediate material cooperation, but because that type of cooperation was
actually avoidable, that is, they lacked sufficient duress.

In. The Application of Immediate Material Cooperation
to Direct Sterilization
This brings us then to Welch's claim that regardless of the moral
intelligibility of the distinction, its application to direct sterilization is
already denied by the Responsum. Here Welch's argument depends on his
translation of the word "admissa." Welch claims the word means "allow."
He acknowledges that the translation from Origins reads "consents" and
writes "The Latin is stronger than the English translation that appeared in
Origins.,,9 Here, I think that Welch violates an important insight regarding
the interpretation of Church documents: laws which prohibit ought never to
be interpreted more strictly than the law states. I wonder why, then, he
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insists on a more onerous translation than that byOrigins.
I read the sentence from the Responsum: "Any cooperation of the
hospitals which approves or consents to actions which are in
themselves ...directed to a contraceptive end ... is absolutely forbidden." This
sentence condemns, in my estimation, any formal cooperation in direct
sterilization.
Welch notes that the verbs are distinct. I agree: approves is an
explicit, positive endorsement, while consent is the acknowledgment of an
action as a good; the latter refers to implicit formal cooperation. Both, then,
are illustrative of a will that formally cooperates. But Welch wants his
alternative, "allows," to connote immediate material cooperation. In the
process, then, he interprets theResponsum more restrictively than others do.
Welch wants an a priori prohibition: regardless of an institution's
survival, immediate material cooperation with direct sterilization (even in the
very limited instance that I described) is never permissible. I see no warrant
for that a priori.

IV. Division or Communion
Finally, Welch convicts me of ignoring an ecclesiology of
communion. I find this charge overwrought and hardly persuasive.
If Pope John Paul II or Cardinal Ratzinger declares that immediate
material cooperation ought never be applied to direct sterilizations, I will
submit immediately to that prudential judgment. But, inasmuch as I have
never seen any such statement nor do I expect one, I see no need to restrict
the Church's tradition now. In a time of enormous pluralism and diversity,
the complexity of the principle of cooperation affords us a way of
demarcating our positions, so as to protect our values and explain our roles
in a variety of collaborative moves. Wisely, at a critical moment in charting
the future of our health care facilities, our bishops and boards rely on
traditional interpretations of traditional principles.
Thus, I wonder why Welch wants to rule out applying a veritably
credible concept that has its limited applicability in the extreme situation of
the demise of one' s life, facility or department. Surely Welch's a priori
exclusion means the automatic loss of a facility and/or a department that
might otherwise have been protected by the principle of cooperation.
Moreover, I know the distinction has relevance to other national
conferences of catholic bishops and their health care facilities. Welch's
argument endangers not only the existence of US facilities but also those
elsewhere. If the application is still considered legitimate, is not Welch's
attempt to foreclose on the concept itself divisive? Where, then, is the
division? Is the division due to my interpretation or to Welch's own?
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